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Political markets? Politics and economics in the emergence of 
markets for biodiversity offsets 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the relationship between politics and performativity of economics 
in the emergence of markets for biodiversity offsets. While the role of economics in 
constructing markets has been demonstrated by sociology and social studies of 
science, it has also become apparent that politics plays an important role in the 
material outcome of economic experiments. Two case studies of the creation of 
markets for biodiversity offsets are analysed, in the United States and England. The 
findings suggest that the creation of both markets is rooted in the language, concepts 
and models of economics. Politics, on the other hand, functions as a mediator of the 
material expression of those models. Through this mediation effect, similar economic 
models are performed differently, resulting in a variety of markets. This suggests that 
the material outcomes of processes of market creation are not defined at the outset, 
but can be influenced by political processes. 




1. On markets, economics and politics 
Despite the growing importance of markets in the functioning of neoliberal economies, 
the origin of these forms of exchange remains under-conceptualised. Economics 
describes markets as naturally-existing phenomena, which emerge whenever the 
necessary conditions are fulfilled (Rosenbaum, 2000). This perspective is 
unsatisfactory, as it fails to provide a comprehensive explanation of the processes by 
which markets are constructed. An alternative approach was first suggested in Michel 
Callon’s book The Laws of the Markets (1998b), which specified a different epistemic 
relationship between economic theory and the materiality of markets: That economics 
contributes to the construction and configuration of economic life, rather than simply 
describing it. Economic sciences provide the practices which define rules, agents and 
models to format markets (Callon, 1998a, 2007; Garcia-Perpet, 2007; MacKenzie, 
2007). However, while this thesis of the performativity of economics is now generally 
acceptanceaccepted, its limitations have also become apparent. On the one hand, the 
performativity thesis has struggled to account for the material diversity of markets 
observed in practice (Svetlova, 2012). On the other hand, by focusing on the technical 
aspects of the construction of markets, it may fail to pay the necessary attention to the 
politics of market creation (Breslau, 2013; Miller, 2002). 
Economics is often performed through economic experiments (Muniesa and Callon, 
2007). A particular type of economic experiment provides an intersection between 
economic sciences and policymaking: In-vivo experiments, which make use of society 
as the experimental setting. In these cases, social or environmental problems are 
framed as instances of market failure (cf. Stern, 2007; TEEB, 2008), caused by the 
proliferation of externalities – economic costs (or benefits) affecting agents which did 
not choose to incur said effects. Economics suggests that addressing these issues 
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requires internalising the underlying externality, which can be done by creating a 
market for it. Much of the experimental work in creating material markets involves 
designing and specifying the properties of the economic objects to be exchanged, by 
framing externalities and making them calculable. This framing is achieved by 
calculative agencies, composed of humans and technological devices, whose 
operations make goods calculable (Callon and Muniesa, 2005; Muniesa et al., 2007; 
Preda, 2006). Through the operation of these calculative agencies, which make use 
of technical and scientific knowledge from economics and other sciences, markets 
become the product of socio-technical practice, (Mitchell, 2008). Economics underpins 
the construction and operation of the socio-technical infrastructure upon which the 
material market is built. Overall, the performativity thesis points to a plausible 
generative mechanism for markets.  
However, as Callon himself notes, economics is necessary but not sufficient to create 
markets (Callon, 2007). One of the issues the performativity theory struggles to 
accommodate is the observable variety of markets. Markets for the same commodity 
can be materially different, be it in terms of their socio-technical infrastructures, of the 
prevalent ‘rules of the game’, or their outcomes (Boyer, 1997). Researchers applying 
the performativity framework have often noted how the politics of market formation can 
colour their results. In MacKenzie’s study of the development of the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme for CO2 emissions (2009), it is shown that the exercise of 
price discovery in the market is impacted by the politics of allocation of emission 
permits amongst polluters. Similarly, Breslau (2013) has shown that the price of 
electricity in US capacity markets is, at any point, as much a product of supply and 
demand as of political considerations. In this sense, the performativity of economics 
is mediated by politics (Breslau, 2013; MacKenzie, 2009): Economics sets the space 
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where experimentation takes place, but the material details of individual economic 
experiments are determined by the interplay of political actors within that space. 
However, the ‘mediation’ model is not the only interpretation of the relationship 
between performativity of economics and the politics of market creation. An alternative 
model, described as ‘marketization’, describes the entanglement of state (political) and 
market actors with the objective of inserting markets into the provision of public goods, 
as part of a neoliberal political project (Birch and Siemiatycki, 2015; Castree, 2008). 
Proponents of this model have sought to integrate the performativity thesis within a 
broader political economy approach (Christophers, 2014a). This strand of research 
sees the idea of the market as a discursive construct, mostly tasked with performing 
problematic political work Biodiversity Offsets Pilot (England).  In their study of the 
creation of Individual Trading Quotas (ITQs) for fisheries in Norway, Holm and Nielsen 
(2007) suggest that the market is performed as a political device, shifting political 
resources in the fishing industry itself. Similarly, Christophers (2014b) has suggested 
that specific economic models are performed by transnational corporations as 
discourses, in order to secure higher profits. Associated with this idea has been a 
critique of the performativity thesis as an exercise in relativism, which seeks to abstract 
market creation from politics and culture (Butler, 2010; Miller, 2002). The 
‘marketization’ model sees the performativity of economics as a tool deployed with 
political objectives. 
The two models (‘mediation’ and ‘marketisation’) describe the relationship between 
performativity of economics and political projects in the construction of markets 
differently. The ‘mediator’ model suggests that economic ideas and models are 
refracted through the prism of mediating political projects and turned into calculative 
devices and socio-technical practices. In this case, it would be expected that markets 
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for the same good would apply similar economic models, subject to differing political 
projects. The result would be a variety of market outcomes. Conversely, the 
‘marketization’ model suggests that the political projects of neoliberalisation and 
assisting capital accumulation are the drivers of the creation of markets. Economics 
would be performed to assist these objectives, used as a discursive device. The result 
would be relatively similar outcomes in different cases, given that the design and 
operation of the market is secondary to its role as a tool for capital accumulation. This 
paper compares how each of the two models fits with observable reality. This is done 
by analysing the creation of two markets for biodiversity offsets, in the United States 
and in England, and observing the role played by economic ideas and models, as well 
as the prevailing political projects in each case. More specifically, the paper identifies 
the genesis of the market in each case, and how economics and politics interact. 
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the concept of biodiversity 
offsetting, as well as the two case studies selected for analysis. Section 3 analyses 
each of the markets in turn. The article concludes by showing how economic concepts 
frame the political action in the creation of markets. The observed variety of market 
outcomes suggests that the ‘mediator’ model is a better description of the relationship 
between performativity of economics and politics. 
 
2. Markets for biodiversity offsets: Political contexts and economic 
experiments 
Empirically, this paper analyses and compares two case studies of the emergence of 
two for biodiversity offsets: Species Banking in the United States, and Biodiversity 
Offsets pilots in England. Biodiversity offsets are defined as ‘...conservation actions 
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intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by 
development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity’ (ten Kate et al., 2004: 
13). In biodiversity offset markets, developers can acquire certified offsets from third 
parties (such as landowners and specialised ‘biodiversity banks’) in a regulated 
marketplace. This allows developers to discharge their legal obligation to compensate 
for the negative impacts of their projects over biodiversity. In other words, these 
markets exist due to planning regulation requiring developers to compensate for their 
impact over nature (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2017). This creates a special analytical 
situation: The exchange between buyers and sellers takes place because of a legal 
requirement. Biodiversity offsets do not hold direct economic value for the developers 
buying them: As one of the interviewees for the study remarked, ‘…a gun to the head 
is the only reason why people buy these credits [offsets]. Other than that, nobody is 
going to be buying’ (Interviewee H). 
Absence of demand apart, these programmes share a number of the characteristics 
which would be expected in markets: There are suppliers of offsets selling biodiversity 
conservation (sellers), buyers of biodiversity offsets (developers) and regulatory 
frameworks (Madsen et al., 2010). Buyers acquire offsets and sellers compete for 
custom, often on the basis of cost (Bayon et al., 2008; Denisoff, 2008). Furthermore, 
a number of techniques and mechanisms for measuring and quantifying biodiversity 
losses must be developed and employed (Madsen et al., 2010, 2011). 
The markets were chosen to represent a mature market (US Species Banking, which 
has been in operation since circa 1992) and a nascent market (UK Biodiversity Offsets 
Pilots, which ran between 2012 and 2014). Secondary data from policy and 
consultancy documents relevant for each case was first collected and analysed. This 
was followed up by 24 semi-structured interviews with appropriate stakeholders. Some 
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of these informants were involved in only one of the case studies, while others had 
worked in both. All interviews took place between 2012 and 2014, during which both 
markets were simultaneously in operation. Table 1 lists the participants, the case they 
are involved in, and their role in the market. 
 
== TABLE 1 HERE == 
 
Participants included policymakers, biodiversity offsetting promoters, offset providers, 
consultants, NGOs, corporate environmental and reputation managers and market 
intermediaries. These groups were selected for their potential roles in creating and 
shaping the markets in each case. Efforts were made to interview comparable 
stakeholders in each case, in order to promote comparability of findings, although 
sometimes this was not possible due to the difficulties of access involved in 
interviewing elite individuals (Desmond, 2004; Goldstein, 2002). These limitations 
were addressed in two ways: First, by interviewing individuals with transnational 
experience of biodiversity offsetting, and which have been involved in more than one 
of these markets. Second, by triangulating interview data with secondary data from 
policy and technical reports, as well as market information from the Species Baking 
website (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2017) 
 
3. Markets for nature: Biodiversity offsets as economic experiments 
The case studies presented share a common aim: To promote markets for biodiversity 
offsets in order to ensure that development results in no net loss of biodiversity (BBOP, 
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2012; eftec and IEEP, 2010; Treweek et al., 2009). The strict definition of biodiversity 
offsetting in terms of no net loss creates a direct, measurable link between losses and 
compensation, establishing equivalence between two alternative land uses. The 
language is directly derived from economics, and suggests that biodiversity can be 
seen as fungible: Biodiversity losses taking place in one location could, in principle, be 
efficiently exchanged by biodiversity gains in another location.  
The concept of no net loss of biodiversity serves as an engine for the development of 
markets for biodiversity offsets: It is a driver of the performativity of economics, which 
establishes a baseline for the material functioning of the market, pointing to the need 
to develop a socio-technical infrastructure to deliver it. At the same time, it is also a 
political construct, which expresses a normative value through language. Economy 
and politics constitute a powerful nexus in the process of creating and shaping 
biodiversity offset markets: Economics provides a political language, which configures 
the material working of market devices, processes and practices (Cochoy et al., 2010). 
However, this in itself does not specify the relationship between economics and politics 
in the context of performativity. This is analysed in the cases below. 
 
3.1 US Species Banking 
3.1.1. Performing economics 
The development of a biodiversity offsetting scheme in the United States derives from 
previous regulation requiring that any losses of endangered species must be 
compensated. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 specified that listed species were 
warranted legal protection, and that their continued survival should take precedence 
over economic gains from land development. This precedence extended up to denial 
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of planning permission. After the Act began to be implemented, local regulators and 
developers began to find that the balance between conservation of biodiversity and 
economic development had shifted excessively in favour of conservation. This was 
noted by Interviewee H, a long-time biodiversity offsets banker in the United States 
and former regulator: 
…as regulators for overseeing endangered species habitats we were 
stopping bad projects, but we could only stop them. If there were good 
projects that needed to move forward there wasn't much we could do 
[Interviewee H] 
By only being able to stop land development proposals with extensive negative 
impacts over biodiversity (‘bad projects’), the regulators found they were harming 
developers and, ultimately, economic growth as well. The problemMoreover, the lack 
of policy mechanisms to balance the needs of conservation and development did not 
affect developers alone. : The restrictions to development imposed by the ESA were 
havingalso had unintended negative consequences for the species they were 
supposed to protect as well. The existence presence of an endangered species could 
severely impactresult in the loss of the potential economic value of an area, due to the 
associated development restrictions. As a result, when confronted with the discovery 
of an endangered species in their land, landowners and developers had all the 
incentive to eradicate that species, and often did so (Bayon et al., 2008).  
These pressures resulted in the development of a set of mechanisms that sought to 
allow development to take place, while simultaneously requiring developers to 
demonstrate that stocks of endangered species would not be affected. These 
experiments resulted in the emergence of a number of competing forms of 
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mechanisms to compensate for biodiversity losses: One-off compensation, where 
offsetting measures are agreed on a case-by-case basis; in-lieu fees, a situation in 
which developers offset biodiversity losses via a monetary payment; and Species 
Banking, an approach which saw the creation of ‘entrepreneurial credit banks’, from 
which developers can acquire pre-certified biodiversity offsets.  
One-off offsets and the payment of in-lieu fees provided the backbone of US mitigation 
and offsetting policy in the 1970s and 1980s (Mead, 2008). Neither can be considered 
a market for biodiversity offsets. One-off offsets are usually delivered by developers 
themselves, which means there is no exchange: There is no seller, and no goods are 
acquired. In the case of in-lieu fees, they involve a direct payment to a third party, such 
as a public agency or a non-governmental organisation, which pools such 
contributions in order to maintain a site. They also tend to occur after the impact takes 
place (Berahzer, 2015). 
Starting in the mid-1990s, Species Banking was created with the intention of operating 
according to the principles of economics. First, the programme is based on the 
possibility of economic exchange: 
…conservation banking is a free market enterprise that allows for the 
sale, purchase or trade of habitat or species, represented by a 
currency referred to as credits. (Mead, 2008: 16, emphasis added) 
Second, the market is a mechanism to allow landowners to capitalise on the non-
market goods which their land produces: 
As in any market, there must be both supply and demand for such a 
system to work. Conservation banking credits are the economic 
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reward supplied by the resource agencies to the landowner, who 
agrees to preserve, protect and manage habitat in perpetuity. (Mead, 
2008: 17, emphasis added) 
And third, there is an implicit model of a demand curve, formed by grouping buyers’ 
willingness to pay for compensation: 
Market prices are based on how much buyers will pay. Since 
conservation banking in voluntary, there is a built-in cap in prices – 
buyers are unlikely to pay more than what it would cost them to supply 
the required mitigation on their own. (Mead, 2008: 17, emphasis 
added) 
The experience with the Species Banking programme shows the importance of 
economics in framing how conservation takes place. It consists of a mechanism for 
addressing biodiversity losses which makes use of the language and models of 
economic sciences. However, the implementation of these principles in practice 
reveals the important role played by politics in shaping the resulting market. 
 
3.1.2. Political challenges 
The operation of the biodiversity offsets market in the Species Banking programme 
involves trading in commodities designated ‘biodiversity credits’. When a development 
project results in losses to an endangered species, planning approval is contingent to 
the developer presenting evidence of appropriate compensation, by acquiring the 
appropriate number of credits from a species bank (Gardner, 2008; Mead, 2008). To 
determine what constitutes appropriate compensation involves estimating the stocks 
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of endangered species in a given area, a process fraught with difficulties (Robertson, 
2006, 2007). In order to avoid the complexity and uncertainties involved in producing 
these estimates, practitioners in the Species Banking programme usually calculate 
equivalence between losses and offset based on a proxy currency – habitat-area size 
(Bonnie and Wilcove, 2008; Fox and Nino-Murcia, 2005). In this commonly used form 
of measurement, biodiversity losses are quantified as the number of acres of habitat 
of a given species lost to a development project. This loss is offset when the developer 
acquires the same number of acres of the same habitat from a species bank. The use 
of area as a proxy for biodiversity credits has the advantage of simplicity and reducing 
the need for complex measurements and calculations. 
However, this simple measure of equivalence has become increasingly contested. 
Alternative methods for calculating in use include ‘habitat quality, habitat quantity, 
species covered, conservation benefits, including contribution to regional conservation 
efforts, property location and configuration, and available or prospective resource 
values’ (USFWS, 2003: 9). As the complexity of calculation increases and new 
variables need to be taken into account, both cost and measurement errors increase. 
But despite these drawbacks, the mitigation banking industry has consistently called 
for more complex measurement and quantification, and lobbied for stronger standards 
to be applied to all offsetting activities. This is a concerted attempt to counter 
competition from non-market forms of compensation, as described by Interviewee D, 
a consultant: 
…the bankers were building these wetland banks and putting in place 
all these incredible structures – you know, financing structures, 
insurance structures, management endowments – this incredible 
amount of work. These are pretty amazing little self-funded protected 
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reserves. It cost them a lot, and the other ways that the regulator 
would allow a company to offset – like paying for an in-lieu fee fund, 
or doing their own offset – were not nearly as rigorous as the banks' 
credits. And so, the bankers were saying ‘you require all of this from 
us, why don't you require it from the others!’, because it makes the 
playing field uneven, it makes us have to charge more for our credits. 
[Interviewee D] 
In their political lobbying for higher complexity, the mitigation banking industry uses 
the language of economics, describing the creation of more stringent standards as a 
mechanism for creating a ‘level playing field’. Another typical comment was made by 
interviewee H, a mitigation banker and former regulator: 
One of the things that the regulation did was try to create a more level 
playing field for the types of mitigation that's being created as a 
permanent responsibility or banking. [Interviewee H] 
The ‘level playing field’ aspect is a clear reference to economics, an invocation of the 
equal opportunities for competitors in the marketplace advocated by economists as a 
mechanism to deliver maximum social welfare. The ‘level playing field’ in question is, 
by default, the market itself. In invoking it, the species banking industry is using the 
language of economics to promote their offer over the non-market competition. This is 
not targeted at buyers in the market (who have no preference for the origin of their 
offsets) but to regulators. The industry is lobbying for their product by noting that the 
existence of other, less-regulated, forms of compensation acts as externalities in their 
market. This description of theis issue as an externality is patent apparent in the 
opinions of Interviewee I, an offsets provider:  
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What ends up happening is the resource agencies will allow leakage 
in the market because of the pressure of high cost credits, allow these 
lesser alternatives to take place, when in fact the credit has financial 
assurances, long-term stewardship, all the bells and whistles: Credit 
release schedule, success criteria, easements in place. But the credits 
are more expensive because of that. If the agencies don't support the 
preference [for market over non-market provision of biodiversity 
offsets], it's very easy to undercut the pricing, and that pressure is 
always in our market. [Interviewee I] 
The comments illustrate the general strategy of the mitigation banking industry in the 
competition for primacy in the provision of compensation: To use the fact that 
regulators require strong standards from Species Banking operators to require that 
non-market competitors are subject to the same requirements. In the background to 
this is a similar campaign undertaken by many of the same actors in the context of the 
wetlands mitigation banking programme, from which Species Banking descends 
(Gardner, 2011). In that instance, the wetlands mitigation industry was successful in 
obtaining a ruling from the federal regulator (the Environmental Protection Agency), 
which gave primacy to the market mechanism over non-market competitors (EPA, 
2008; Hough and Robertson, 2008). However, there is evidence that implementation 
of this ruling remains patchy (Kett, 2010; Madsen, 2013).  
Performing economics has not, so far, been able to completely turn politics to the 
market promoters’ advantage. The non-market forms of compensation remain in 
operation, and account for a significantly larger proportion of offsetting that than 
Species Banking does (Dempsey and Suarez, 2016). The market form of biodiversity 
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offsetting in the United States is not hegemonic, and does not appear to be the result 
of a deliberate political project. 
The origins of the Species Banking market can be found in economic sciences. 
Despite the existence of other forms of compensation for biodiversity losses, a market 
was created to perform economics. However, the political environment has been 
challenging to the market, not only by limiting the scope of what can be offset 
(endangered species), but also by allowing non-market forms of compensation to take 
place. The material expression of the Species Banking market (offsetting for 
endangered species only, expensive and uncompetitive conservation banks, limited 
size) is the result of performativity of economics, mediated by politics. 
 
3.2. UK Biodiversity Offsets pilot programme 
3.2.1. Performing economics 
The Biodiversity Offsets pilot program operated in England between July 2012 and the 
end of 2014. Compensation for biodiversity losses is covered by Section 106 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990, through which developers and local authorities 
can negotiate compensation agreements. However, the results of these case-by-case 
arrangements have been criticized for their inability to deliver appropriate levels of 
conservation (Latimer and Hill, 2007). These critiques focused around the apparent 
market failure in the existing planning regime in England: As a non-market good, 
biodiversity is under-valued, under-sold and over-exploited (Ferreira, 2017). These 
criticisms were repeated in a number of policy papers, which suggested biodiversity 




In the aftermath of the 2010 UK General Election biodiversity offsetting gained political 
traction, as the Conservative Party, now in government, had pledged to pilot offsetting 
in its electoral manifesto. In 2012 the Department for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) announced that 6 pilot biodiversity offset projects would be 
commissioned to test the approach (DEFRA, 2012). Explaining the advantages of 
biodiversity offsets against other forms of compensation for biodiversity losses, a 
bureaucrat at DEFRA set out the advantages of the market approach versus existing 
forms of compensation: 
It [mechanisms for offsetting] is a spectrum. Habitat banking is 
obviously much more linked to that trading in credits, and setting up a 
bank in advance of the actual development and offset, or credit for it... 
and at the other end of the spectrum you've got the developers doing 
their own offsetting projects. (…) I do lean towards the more market-
end spectrum, partly because that potential to develop the project ex-
ante, and that building-up of supply-side facilitates that whole proper 
offsetting and delivering of no net loss of biodiversity. I see that as the 
option that would fulfil the no net loss of biodiversity. [Interviewee K] 
For this respondent, the market is being compared and contrasted with non-market 
mechanisms for procuring compensation for biodiversity losses, and found to be a 
better solution. In particular, the market is identified as the single mechanism which 
would deliver the hoped-for no net loss of biodiversity. The normative preference for 
no net loss of biodiversity means applying the language, tools and procedures of 
economics to the problem of biodiversity loss. 
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However, it soon became apparent that the programme was also part of a political 
project to reform the UK’s planning regime. This was made clear by the Secretary of 
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who in his introduction of the program 
to Parliament stated that: 
Some planning decisions take too long and the outcome can be too 
uncertain, which can hinder development. At the same time 
biodiversity impacts are not always adequately taken into account, or 
mitigated or compensated for in ways that deliver enduring 
environmental benefit. Biodiversity offsetting has the potential to help 
the planning system deliver more for the environment and the 
economy. (Paterson, 2013) 
In this interpretation, biodiversity offsets were also being promoted as a mechanism 
to help overcome environmental restrictions to development. The same point was 
made by the DEFRA-sponsored Ecosystem Markets Task Force (EMTF), which 
elected biodiversity offsets as the ecosystems market most likely to deliver economic 
growth for the UK (EMTF, 2013). Together, these two positions suggest that, apart 
from promoting conservation, biodiversity offsetting was doing a significant amount of 
political work, serving as a mechanism to reform a contentious regime of governance. 
However, the political project was framed by the need to perform the models and 
precepts of economic sciences: The attempt to reform planning had to conform to the 
‘the laws of the markets’. The power of the economic framing over the political 
objectives became especially clear in the choice made by the regulator with regards 




3.2.2. Political challenges 
The political desire to ensure that biodiversity offsets would play a significant role in 
the planning process had an impact on the commodity chosen. Rather than covering 
only specific aspects of nature – such as endangered species, as in the Species 
Banking case – the pilots were designed to provide compensation for habitat losses 
(DEFRA, 2011a). This meant that the program needed to cover a broader range of 
situations, and thus be reproducible in different locations and ecological contexts 
(Ferreira, 2017). DEFRA suggested that ‘habitat types’ and their ‘level of protection’ 
were the important dimensions of biodiversity which must be accounted for in 
demonstrating no net loss of biodiversity (DEFRA, 2011a). This relatively imprecise 
definition of what exactly should be included in calculation was a consistent feature of 
most policy papers throughout development of offsetting in England (see, for example, 
DEFRA, 2010, 2011b; Lawton et al., 2010). These difficulties became embedded in 
the calculative device proposed by DEFRA to underpin the market: The biodiversity 
‘metric’: 
Biodiversity in its entirety is impossible to measure so a ‘metric’ is used 
to represent, and provide a measure of, overall biodiversity. Metrics 
are surrogates, or combinations of measurements, that together 
provide an assessment of the biodiversity value of a particular area. 
The metric allows the biodiversity impact of a development to be 
quantified so that the offset requirement, and the value of the 
compensatory action, can be clearly defined. Metrics are transferable 
between sites and habitats, allowing an impact on one habitat type to 
be offset with conservation action elsewhere, or involving a different 
habitat type and/or quality of habitat. (DEFRA, 2011a: 2) 
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DEFRA’s biodiversity metric worked by attempting to reduce the multivariate aspects 
of biodiversity to single indicator. Through the action of the commodification 
technologies, the meaning of biodiversity as a localised set of goods, services and 
values is changed: The metric normalised and established a language of “credits” and 
“debts” which is at the root of the concept of no net loss of biodiversity. It economised 
biodiversity.  
However, biodiversity is a complex construct, ranging from the micro-cellular to the 
ecosystem level, often complemented by socio-cultural aspects attached to it by 
individuals or groups. This makes biodiversity an ‘uncooperative commodity’ (Bakker, 
2003, 2005), a good which presents difficulties to calculative agencies. In addition, 
there is a paucity of reliable tools to calculate the value of a habitat, as required by the 
DEFRA stipulations. This created a series of problems in terms of developing a reliable 
commodity.  
The question of how to measure biodiversity concerns not only the work of calculative 
agencies, but the functioning of a market for biodiversity offsets. There is a 
fundamental tension between improving market operation and more complex 
measurement, as noted by an ecological consultant who has worked on environmental 
restauration for a number of years: 
…if you have a very broad definition of the different components of 
biodiversity that are required to be offset, then you will be able to 
generate the flexible, and sort of deeper market. [Interviewee E] 
Put another way, the development of ever more precise technical devices for the 
commodification of biodiversity, which can identify ever finer distinctions between two 
areas, may paradoxically result in greater restrictions to the comparability and 
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exchangeability of development and offset area (Quétier, 2012; Robertson, 2004). 
However, this comparability and exchangeability – the possibility that agents can 
evaluate the trade-offs between two distinct states of the world and choose between 
them – is at the core of the existence of a market. It is also implicit in the definition of 
no net loss of biodiversity, which establishes the requirement that biodiversity lost in 
one place is thoroughly compensated by biodiversity gained elsewhere. 
In the event, the biodiversity offset pilots were completed and finished operating in 
2014. Offsetting still takes place, but only on a case-by-case basis. No nationwide 
market for biodiversity offsetting has been established in England. The final report to 
DEFRA suggests that there was considerable interest in the concept of offsetting, but 
that developers were not interested in incurring the extra costs involved in acquiring 
biodiversity offsets (Collingwood Environmental Planning and IEEP, 2014). 
Developers would certainly agree with the political project to streamline and simplify 
planning; however, the regulator’s appetite for a market for biodiversity offsetting, 
rather than reforming planning laws, was not widely shared. Economics was used to 
frame the debate about the relationship between conservation and development, and 
restricted the mechanisms by which the issues could be addressed. The focus of the 
activity rested on developing a calculative infrastructure and constructing a market; 
The political project served as a mediator, defining what constituted a valid commodity, 
and setting market actors up for developing a complex, and eventually unsuccessful, 




4. Discussion and conclusions: Politics mediating economics 
This article has discussed the interplay of politics and economics in the construction 
of markets, using as case studies the emergence of markets for biodiversity offsets in 
the United States (Species Banking) and in England (Biodiversity Offsets Pilots). 
Politics and economics are both involved in the emergence of these markets, but the 
relationship between them is complex. In both cases, economic models and ideas are 
at the genesis of the market. However, to accept that politics and economics are both 
performative and that they combine in the process of market creation is not the same 
as accepting the ‘marketisation’ hypotheses of market creation. Economic models and 
ideas are not used only for the purposes of undertaking the difficult political work of 
circumscribing or weakening regulations which put conservation ahead of 
development. If this was the case, the actors interested in promoting a hegemonic 
neoliberal model of conservation would likely avoid any aspects of the market 
approach which did not suit their political project. In fact, the opposite can be observed: 
The normative aspects of economics, which prescribe that markets must conform to 
the economic model, are potent drivers for action.  
In both case studies, market actors have attempted to promote compensation via a 
market for biodiversity offsets as a genuine alternative to non-market forms of 
compensation. The evidence for this comes from the insistence, in both cases, that all 
compensation activity should obey higher standards than what is on offer on non-
market arrangements. The commitment to this is so strong that it has, in effect, 
condemned the markets to either remain small (in the United States) or to disappear 
altogether (in England).  
The specific political projects and challenges in each programme play out within the 
strictly-defined space of economic models. Politics does not create the market, but it 
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affects how it operates. This means that the outcomes observed – in terms of market 
structure and functioning – are the result of mediation: A market for endangered 
species is necessarily different from a market designed to compensate for losses to 
all types of habitats, particularly in terms of the calculative agencies which make nature 
calculable. But despite these differences, the two markets are clearly products of the 
same set of ideas and models. Both were constructed by performing economic models 
and ideas, and this performation was mediated by individual political projects. The 
markets are the result of economics being performed, and politics mediates the 
process. The result is materially different markets. 
Politics and economics cannot be understood as separate aspects of the process 
constructing the economy. As noted above, the engines of performativity can be 
discursive and language-based. As an example, no net loss of biodiversity is not a 
recognisable neoclassical economic model; instead, it is a construct which brings 
together ethical and normative considerations, which give it a political dimension. This 
is not surprising: It has been recognised that the performativity of economics involves 
a political dimension (Cochoy et al., 2010), and that politics and the economy are co-
produced in the same performation process (Callon, 2010). It also means that 
economics is not and anti-politics machine, employed to reduce legitimate political 
debate, as appears to be suggested by the ‘marketisation’ thesis. Rather, it means 
that the materials outcomes of the market are not defined at the outset. This opens 
opportunities for political actors to oppose the domination of neoliberal doctrines, 
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